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Abstract  This article analyzes the impacts of ENGOs 
with respect to Maltese climate change policy in an EU 
context. In particular, focus is made on the politics of 
climate change in Malta and the EU in the first five years 
following the country’s EU accession, which led to the 
setting of energy emissions targets by 2020. The main 
conclusion of this article is that ENGOs formed part of an 
EU-wide hegemonic formation on climate change, wherein 
a common position with binding emissions targets was 
reached. The common position was signified around the 
discourse of ecological modernization. EU multi-level 
governance provided an opportunity for ENGOs to put 
forward discourses for climate-change adaptation. 
Keywords   Environmental NGOs, Climate Change 
Politics, EU Governance, Sociology of Climate Change 
1. Introduction
According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC) [1], Malta is vulnerable to the effects of 
climate change, for example due to sea-level rise. Economic 
sectors such as tourism, fishing and public utilities are 
deemed to be the most vulnerable, even though the country 
has considerable experience in adaptation to variability in 
climate. 
Yet Malta was a European laggard in sustainable energy 
policy when the European Union (EU) was discussing its 
climate change targets for 2020. Malta was on the bottom of 
the EU list regarding the share of renewable energy within 
final energy consumption, and it had the highest energy 
dependency rate in the EU due to its oil imports [2]. Malta’s 
greenhouse gas emissions rose by 49 per cent between 1990 
and 2007. At 89 per cent, the energy sector was the highest 
contributor to greenhouse gas emissions [3]. 
Within the bigger picture however, Malta was one of the 
lowest emitters of greenhouses gases in the EU [2], [3]. Even 
though its share of greenhouses gases was on the increase, 
this only amounted to 0.1 per cent of the EU total. Malta also 
had the second highest greenhouse gas emissions per capita 
in the EU, second only to Cyprus, another small-island 
member state [2]. 
This takes us to the scope of this study. This article 
analyzes the impacts of ENGOs with respect to Maltese 
climate change policy in an EU context. In particular, focus 
is made on the politics of climate change in Malta and the EU 
in the first five years following the country’s EU accession, 
which led to the setting of energy emissions targets by 2020. 
This article focuses specifically on the political processes 
related to climate change policy, and not on the validity or 
otherwise of claims on the scientific merits of each policy. 
Indeed, it is argued that even though environmental concerns 
such as climate change may factually exist externally to 
human consciousness, they do not ‘constitute themselves as 
objects outside any discursive conditions of emergence’ [4]. 
The next section will discuss the construction of climate 
change policy in Malta in relation to its EU accession in 
2004. 
2. The Construction of Climate Change
Policy in European Malta
Prior to Malta’s EU accession in 2004, climate change was 
not mainstreamed in Maltese legislation and policy, even if it 
was Malta’s appeal regarding climate change in 1988 that 
kick-started the process culminating in the Climate Change 
Convention of the United Nations in 1992 [5], which Malta 
ratified in 1994. 
During this period, calls were being made for Malta’s 
adaptation to climate change. For example, in its report 
‘Sustainable Malta’ [6], Friends of the Earth Malta appealed 
to the Government of Malta to reduced carbon dioxide 
emissions by 33 per cent by 2010 and by 79 per cent by 2050. 
This was quite an ambitious demand. Indeed, between 
1990 and 2002, energy consumption in Malta grew by 61 per 
cent [7], and there was no significant infrastructure for 
renewable energy such as solar and wind energy [8]. 
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By the time that Malta became an EU member-state, 
climate change became a major policy issue. The EU was 
setting up targets for 2020 and beyond, and ENGOs 
organized at EU and national levels were mobilizing 
themselves in this regard.  
During 2006 ENGOs organized at an EU level appealed 
for EU greenhouse emission reductions by at least 30 per 
cent by 2020 and 80 per cent by 2050, in order to reach the 
European Council’s goal of keeping global temperature rise 
below 2 degrees Celsius over pre-industrial levels. They also 
appealed for a 25 per cent target of renewable energy sources 
by 2020, for a reduction of at least 20 per cent of energy 
consumption by 2020 [9]. 
When the European Commission (EC) published its green 
paper on climate change in 2006, it highlighted six priorities 
which were not as binding and ambitious as those proposed 
by the ENGOs. Besides, this required addressing global 
warming, with possible 2020 targets ‘in order to provide a 
stable investment climate to generate more competitive 
renewable energy in Europe’; the boosting of energy 
technology to ‘ensure that European industries are world 
leaders’, and ensuring that the EU speaks with a common 
external voice [10]. 
In the meantime, Malta and some other EU member states 
were falling back in compliance with the EU legislation ([11], 
[12], [13]). The European Commission pressurized such 
countries to conform to EU requirements. This was endorsed 
by European and Maltese ENGOs, though they believed that 
it did not go far enough ([14], [15]). 
Subsequently, the European Commission launched its new 
energy policy subject for approval by the Council of 
Ministers, which, amongst other proposals aimed to cut CO2 
emissions by at least 20 per cent by 2020 compared to 1990 
levels, with a further increase to 30 per cent should other 
developed nations comply through an international 
agreement. This target was way above the 8 per cent Kyoto 
target that the EU supported in 1997 and which entered into 
force in 2005. The European Commission also proposed a 
binding target of 20 per cent renewable energy by 2020 (up 
from 7 per cent), a 10 per cent target for biofuels for transport, 
and increased energy efficiency by 20 per cent [16]. Maltese 
ENGOs and the non-parliamentary Green Party pressured 
the Maltese Government to support such changes [17]. 
During 2007, the Environment ministers from the EU 
member states unanimously backed the proposals of the 
European Commission. This was applauded by ENGOs [18]. 
At the same time, various EU member states, including 
Malta, appealed for concessions on their national share of 
CO2 reductions, and called for flexibility and for voluntary as 
opposed to mandatory national targets ([19], [20], [21]). 
During the EU summit held in March 2007, the EU leaders 
upheld the proposals of the European Commission, but also 
agreed with the proposal of member states including Malta 
that national targets should vary in accordance with each 
country’s circumstances. However, these targets were to be 
binding [22]. 
ENGOs at European and Maltese levels noted the 
EU-wide agreement, but called for more political will in 
order to reach the targets, which were lower than what 
ENGOs demanded ( [23], [21], [24], [25], [26], [27], [28]). 
The upcoming United Nations’ global summit on climate 
change was due to be held in Copenhagen during December 
2009. The EU was finalizing its climate policy, and ENGOs 
kept up their activism in this respect [29]. 
In this context European Commission President Barroso 
seemed to play the role of arbiter between different positions, 
when he spoke about ‘historic’ plans to make the EU ‘the 
first economy for the low-carbon age’ in his address to the 
European Parliament. Barroso said that the Commission’s 
plans were ‘not in favor of the environment and against the 
economy’ [23]. The European Parliament backed the plans 
for an increased use of renewable energy [30]. 
In the meantime, general elections were held in Malta in 
March 2008. Climate change was not a key electoral issue, 
but nevertheless Malta still had to lobby and formulate 
climate change policy within an EU framework. The 
centre-right Nationalist Party remained in power, and 
consequently the new Government set up a committee for 
climate change. This comprised various representatives from 
various sectors, including some ENGO members – though 
not all ENGOs were asked to participate. The committee had 
to ensure that Malta fulfilled its EU obligations regarding 
CO2 emissions and alternative energy [31]. Concurrently, 
various ENGOs presented proposals as to how the Maltese 
Government could achieve its goals ([32], [33], [34], [35]). 
Late in 2008, negotiators from the European Parliament, 
the European Commission and the member states agreed on a 
compromise which would establish mandatory targets for 
member states in order that the EU may achieve the 20 per 
cent renewable energy target by 2020. Through the deal, the 
EU member states would be able to plan joint projects and to 
transfer renewable energy produced ‘statistically’ between 
themselves. The agreement was welcome on the ENGO front, 
albeit criticized for its loopholes [36], which eventually were 
exploited by some member states including Malta in their 
claim for future reviews and fairness among member states 
([37], [38]). 
The EU eventually finalized its climate deal in December 
2008. An agreement on a 20 per cent reduction of CO2 
emissions and 20 per cent production of renewable energy 
was reached. Various compromises were made, resulting in 
criticism from the ENGOs and greens especially due to the 
high levels of carbon offsets. As a result of these 
compromises member states were being allowed to pay for 
emissions cuts in developing countries rather than in their 
own respective countries [39]. 
When the Copenhagen summit eventually took place, the 
environmental movement was disappointed by its outcome, 
as it did not result in any clear binding targets [40]. At the 
same time, however, the EU confirmed its own targets and 
eventually set up a Directorate General for Climate Action 
within the European Commission [41]. 
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Malta now had to comply with the EU target through 
which Malta would be required produce 10 per cent of its 
energy from clean renewable sources by 2020. This included 
energy from transport, electricity, heating and cooling [42]. 
Malta was also obliged to limit CO2 emissions increase by 5 
per cent by 2020 and to have 10 per cent biofuel for transport 
use by 2020 [43]. Malta’s targets were the lowest in the EU, 
even though this presented a significant increase from what 
was in place. For example, renewable energy accounted for 
only 0.36 per cent of the country’s total energy mix. [44]. 
The following table highlights major changes in climate 
change policy-making in the EU and Malta between 2004 
and 2009. 
Chronology of Climate Change Policy Making in EU and Malta 
2004 Malta joins the European Union 
2006 EU ENGOs call for ambitious EU greenhouse emissions 
2006 EC publishes green paper on climate change, with less ambitious 
targets 
2006 Malta and other MS were falling back in compliance with EU 
legislation 
2007 EC launches energy policy subject for approval by ECM 
2007 Malta ENGOs pressure Government to support EC proposals 
2007 ECM unanimously back EC proposals 
2007 Some MS including Malta appeal for concessions and flexibility 
2007 EU summit upholds both EC and MS proposals, with varying 
national targets 
2008 EC, EP and ECM agree on compromise deal with varying national 
targets 
2008 EU finalizes its climate deal, in advance of UN summit in 2009 
2009 UN summit fails to reach binding targets. EU and MS stand by 
their respective targets 
3. Conceptualizing Policy Impacts of 
ENGOs 
The next sub-sections will provide a theoretical 
framework through which one can analyze the impacts of 
ENGOs in relation to climate change policy in European 
Malta. For this purpose, the concepts of hegemonic 
formations, substantive impacts and multi-level governance 
will be discussed. This will be followed by a discussion on 
major political discourses of climate change. 
Hegemonic Formations 
The main thrust of this article is to verify the impact of 
ENGOs on climate change policy in European Malta. This 
was achieved by means of an EU-wide general agreement 
within the EU that represented a condensation of different – 
and often – conflicting claims. Still, the overarching 
discourse was broad enough to include plural social actors, 
ranging from Governments to ENGOs, within it. 
Policy-making was carried out through multi-level 
governance within European and Maltese levels. 
In order to analyze the most influential discourses in this 
regard, this study draws upon discourse theory ([4], [45], 
[46], [47], [48], [49]). 
In this regard, ENGOs are conceptualized as being active 
in politics through discursive constructions. Social agents 
including Governments, European institutions, political 
parties and forces within civil society engage in articulatory 
practice and temporarily fix meaning through nodal points [4] 
comprising empty signifiers which are filled up with 
discursive claims ([45], [50], [47]). 
Here, discursive coalitions are formed between insiders 
and outsiders, where internal differences are minimized in 
opposition to the discursive exterior [51]. This means that the 
commonalities of insiders are emphasized within ‘chains of 
equivalence’ [4], where specific demands of social agents 
are partially surrendered for the greater good. The universal 
claim that unites its components is greater than particular 
demands which characterize the individual social agents 
within it. ‘Conflictual consensus’ [52] may therefore be in 
place within chains of equivalence. 
In turn, this may give rise to hegemonic formations, where 
‘privileged condensations of meaning confer partially fixed 
meaning on a particular set of signifiers’ [48]. Diverse 
democratic demands achieve ‘a maximum of integration’ 
Mouffe[4] and are empowered to bring about political and/or 
social change. At the same time, given that a hegemonic 
formation excludes other discourses, it can be opposed by 
counter-hegemonic practices [53]. 
Substantive Impacts 
This research elaborates on the construction of hegemonic 
formations by employing the concept of external impacts of 
social movements ([54], [55], [56], [57]), with particular 
emphasis on substantive impacts. These can range from 
'challengers' ...[ability] ... to exert a veto against a policy 
or against a decision taken by political authorities... [to 
the ability to] ... obtain substantive concessions by 
political authorities. In this case, they acquire 
policy-making power’ ( [54]). 
Further examples may include decisive decisions by the 
State, the setting up of legislation and enforcement measures. 
In this respect, environmental movements do not usually 
obtain too many substantive impacts [55]. One exemption 
may be within certain local issues [57], but these ‘have rarely 
proved decisive in the wider policy arena’ [56]. Besides, 
Carter makes it clear that the mainstream environmental 
movement has experienced primarily from a ‘negative’ 
substantive impact, wherein in does not manage to change 
policy discourses. 
The concept of substantive impacts can help elaborate the 
analysis of hegemonic formations as it is hereby argued that 
success and failure can co-exist in a paradoxical relationship. 
For example environmental movements can influence policy 
making whilst being less successful in halting the 
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deterioration of the environment [58]. In the specific context 
of this study, a hegemonic formation on climate change may 
be partially satisfying for environmentalists but might still 
not be considered sufficient to halt consequences of climate 
change on the natural environment. 
Multi-level Governance 
This article also draws upon literature concerning 
multi-level governance so as to conceptualize the interaction 
between national and European politics and activism of 
ENGOS in this regard. 
Literature on social movements and European 
environmental politics has suggested that research in this 
area should focus on different geographical areas at the same 
time, or ‘multi-level activism’ Heijden [29]. At the same 
time, research on the Europeanization of environmental 
policy can focus on ‘both the shaping and taking of EU 
policies’ [59]. 
According to van Der Heijden [29], ‘the EU’s most 
important feature is its evolution into a system of multi-level 
governance as opposed to state-led government.’ (p.5). It 
turn, multi-level governance is defined as ‘the dispersion of 
authoritative decision making across multiple territorial 
levels’ [60]. 
Within multi-level governance, national governments do 
not possess a monopoly of power, but have to share 
decision-making with other actors at different levels. In an 
EU context, this form of governance is characterized by a 
dispersion of competencies, interlocking institutions and 
shifting agendas Heijden [29]. 
Climate change policy is an example of multi-level 
governance and environmentalism (ibid, p.200) within 
national, EU and global contexts. Indeed the global climate 
campaign under study comprised various environmental 
movement organizations and illustrates the evolution of one 
‘global green public sphere (ibid p. 197). This points towards 
the importance of systematic study of environmental 
movements ‘at different geographical levels at the same time’ 
(ibid) 
Tanya Börzel [59] adds that ENGOs coming from 
Southern European countries are most likely to benefit from 
opportunities provided by the EU which can be used to put 
pressure on their respective governments, are at the same 
time most likely to take advantage of them, given their lack 
of resources. Social actors who do not exploit resources to 
their advantage on the international level are likely to be 
weakened, due to the fact that much environmental policy is 
being carried out beyond the nation state. 
Multi-level governance and activism is of particular 
interest for this article. The EU is conceptualized as a 
possible gateway through multi-level governance, enabling 
ENGOs at European and national levels to have impacts on 
policy-making. 
Discourses of Climate Change 
Another key concept used in this study relates to the 
construction of discourses of climate change within EU 
policy-making. 
Scholarly literature relates EU environmental policy to the 
discourses of sustainable development and ecological 
modernization ([61], [62], [63]) albeit within a context of 
strong neo-liberal tendencies (Pesendorfer[64], van der 
Heijden [29]). Radical discourses of system change are not 
so influential within an EU context ([65], [66]). 
Sustainable development attempts to reconcile economic, 
social and environmental factors through the involvement of 
the State and civil society by means of cooperation at 
international, national and local levels [67]. It is enshrined in 
the treaties of the EU, but the predominant way how it is 
articulated is through the discourse of ecological 
modernization ([29], [62]). 
Ecological modernization, promotes environmentally 
sound technological development within highly 
industrialized societies having democratic institutions. A 
main feature of this discourse is the belief that economic 
growth and environmental protection can complement each 
other within existing political, social and economic 
structures ( [56], [68], [69] [67]). According to Hajer [29], 
ecological modernization can be described as a discourse 
coalition between business, scientists, reformist progressive 
politicians and much of the environmental movement. 
Ecological modernization can be summed up as follows: 
Ecological Modernization 
Technological 
Economic and environmental complementation 
Reformist 
At a European level, ENGOs have formed coalitions such 
as Green 10, which is characterized by moderate 
environmental discourse when dealing with climate change 
issues [66] and the Spring Alliance, which has challenged the 
‘neo-liberal European Union policy frame’ [29]. 
Some European ENGOs have their own Maltese 
counterparts - such as Birdlife and Friends of the Earth. 
Malta also has a Green Party which has been elected in some 
local councils but which has considerable presence in 
Malta’s public sphere. Overdevelopment of land and 
conservationism are major preoccupations of 
environmentalists and moderate discourses are predominant 
([70], [71]). ENGOs are largely active in a context of 
two-party dominance ([72], [73]), even though, following 
EU accession, the Maltese Government ‘cannot unilaterally 
craft legislation that has clear implications on the other 
member states of the EU, and on the EU itself’ [74]. 
4. Research Question and Methods 
In view of the literature presented above, this article seeks 
to answer the following research question: 
What were the impacts of ENGOs with respect to Maltese 
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climate change policy in an EU context? 
For the purpose of this study, the main concepts referred to 
previously were operationalized in relation to the 
construction of climate change policy in Malta within an EU 
context. 
The main discourses under analysis were identified 
through data in textual form. Data for this study was 
primarily obtained from one Maltese newspaper, the 
English-speaking daily newspaper ‘Times of Malta’ and its 
sister newspaper ‘The Sunday Times of Malta’. These are 
Malta’s best-selling newspapers and they have a long 
tradition in journalism since the 1930s. They also have a very 
strong online presence. Allied Newspapers, which publishes 
The Times of Malta, has been described as ‘an institution in 
itself’ [75]. 
Twenty seven news articles for the period 2006-2009 and 
which were related to Malta’s climate change policies in an 
EU context were collected and analyzed for this purpose. 
These were supplemented by other news articles during this 
period from international news agencies, namely Reuters 
(through its Planet Ark website) (8 articles), Euractiv.com (8 
articles) and EUobserver.com (4 articles). 
All articles were collected systematically through regular 
screening of news items dealing with the interaction of EU 
policy on climate change with environmental activism and/or 
Maltese policy-making. Data was coded in a qualitative 
manner, where the emphasis was on strategic importance of 
discursive threads and key events rather than quantitative 
presence of data. For example, a statement resulting from an 
EU summit might have been produced once, yet its strategic 
effect is of prime significance in view of its influence on 
policy making. Hence, collection of information from 
newspapers and other documents involved the unearthing of 
‘essences with sufficient context’ [76], where even ‘a single 
speech or newspaper report or conversation can generate 
very fruitful themes for analysis’ [77]. 
Commonalities and differences in discourses of ENGOs, 
EU institutions, national governments and other social actors 
were highlighted, so as to identify the existence of discourse 
coalitions that were signified through nodal points and 
chains of equivalence. Consequently, it was possible to 
verify whether a hegemonic formation was formed, and if 
yes which discourses were included within it. 
In particular, the following discourses were sought for: 
 Radical: Need for system change 
 Ecological Modernization: Need for stronger obligatory 
targets across the EU 
 Ecological Modernization: Need for voluntary targets 
on a national level 
 Ecological Modernization: Need for weaker obligatory 
targets across the EU 
 Discursive exterior: No need for change. 
These discourses were analyzed in relation to van Der 
Heijden's [29] assertion that within the EU sustainable 
development is seen as being framed through ecological 
modernization, 
‘the discourse that recognizes the structural character of 
environmental problems, but nevertheless assumes that 
existing political, economic and social institutions can 
internalize care for the environment’ (p.197). 
Hence ecological modernization occupied the role of 
nodal point. The social actors which were analyzed were EU 
institutions, the Government of Malta, European and Maltese 
ENGOs. Occasional reference was also made to business 
representatives on an EU level as well as political parties. 
It is important to note that the Maltese ENGOs which 
spoke up on climate change were generally active on a 
national level, though they relied on the lobbying of 
European ENGOs at an EU level. The discursive 
constructions of the latter as reported in the media were 
therefore given due importance in this study. 
In the case of Friends of the Earth Malta, its activism was 
integrated with that of its European counterparts. For 
example, as the United Nations’ global summit on climate 
change in Copenhagen, held in December 2009, was 
approaching, it participated with other national branches of 
Friends of the Earth International during the Global Day of 
Action on Climate activities [29]. 
Discourse analysis was applied in relation to the positions 
of social actors with relation to the nodal point of ecological 
modernization and the way this was signified through their 
discourses. If a substantive impact was achieved through 
policy change, and if this had some form of consensus 
around it, then a hegemonic formation was seen to be 
constructed. 
5. Results 
The results of this research show that the most influential 
discourse at EU level was that of ecological modernization 
which would be implemented through weaker obligatory 
targets across the EU. This discourse was particularly 
suitable for Malta, given its lack of a climate change policies 
and its need to catch up with many other EU member states. 
This discourse was also more likely to reach support across 
the political and civil society spectrum within the EU. 
Specific analysis of each discourse produced the following 
results: 
 Radical: Need for System Change 
This radical discourse was generally not favored by 
ENGOs. The only Maltese exception was Zminijietna Voice 
of the Left, which considered the EU proposals to be situated 
within  
‘a capitalist framework of endless production, 
commodification and technological quick-fixes, which, 
ultimately, do not solve the problems of wasteful 
consumption and social inequality’ [26]. 
At this time, Zminijietna also had an antagonistic 
approach on the EU treaty, considering it to be a neo-liberal 
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imposition with profound implications. Zminijietna’s stance 
on the EU treaty was not in conformity with that of other 
ENGOs. Indeed, EU ENGOs such as the European 
Environmental Bureau [78], on behalf of 143 ENGOs, were 
rather upbeat about it, and praised aspects such as 
democratization and transparency. 
 Ecological Modernization: Need for Stronger 
Obligatory Targets across the EU 
This discourse comprised the main arguments put forward 
by ENGOs at a European level, and which was supported by 
Maltese ENGOs. During 2006, ENGOs organized at an EU 
level appealed for EU greenhouse emission reductions by at 
least 30 per cent by 2020 and 80 per cent by 2050, in order to 
reach the European Council’s goal of keeping global 
temperature rise below 2 degrees Celsius over pre-industrial 
levels. They also appealed for a 25 per cent target of 
renewable energy sources by 2020, for a reduction of at least 
20 per cent of energy consumption by 2020, which could 
save 60 billion Euros per year and create ‘as many as 1 
million new jobs’ [9]. This approach was reformist and 
focused on technological change. 
In this regard, WWF [28] claimed that climate change is 
happening faster than predicted, with huge adverse risks in 
various sectors – from food to health - in the pipeline. 
The Green 10 [79] alliance of European ENGOs used 
consensual rhetoric by appealing to the European 
Commission to match green rhetoric with action by 
recognizing that the environment and the economy can be 
complimentary. With respect to greenhouse gas reductions 
the European Environment Bureau and the European Trade 
Union Confederation called for tax adjustments so as to 
protect EU-based industry from ‘unfair competition’ [29]. 
In Malta, ENGOs [17] supported the calls of their 
European counterparts, but also called for the Maltese 
Government to support the EU in the implementation of the 
Kyoto targets and in post-Kyoto discussions especially when 
Malta was a laggard in policies such as investment in 
renewable energy. Nature Trust [27], Moviment Graffitti 
[27], Din l-Art Helwa [32] all called for increased 
investment in renewable energy. 
The discourses of Maltese ENGOs were not without their 
own antagonisms, however. For example, when the 
Government of Malta earmarked a particular site for offshore 
wind farms, Birdlife Malta and Bicref expressed their 
opposition through conservationist claims in view of bird 
colonies in a nearby Natura 2000 site and in view of marine 
ecosystems. Bicref[80] said that solar energy should be 
considered before other options. 
All in all, European and Maltese ENGOs signified 
ecological modernization through technological change, 
reformist policy, and complementation of environmental and 
economic factors. 
 Ecological Modernization: Need for Voluntary Targets 
on a National Level 
An alternative discourse of flexible targets was promoted 
by national governments and business representatives. This 
contrasted with the demands of the environmental movement, 
even though it recognized the need for reform, technological 
change and possible complementation of economic and 
environmental factors.  
When in 2007 environment ministers from EU member 
states unanimously backed the proposals of the European 
Commission, it transpired that antagonistic political 
demands were being articulated, both by national 
governments and business representatives. Various Ministers, 
including Malta’s appealed for EU concessions on 
greenhouse gas reductions and for voluntary – rather than 
mandatory – national targets [19]. Prior to the European 
Council meeting that dealt with the matter, Prime Minister 
Lawrence Gonzi said: 
‘We can’t have hydroelectric power as we have no 
rivers or dams. We can’t have the amount of 
photovoltaic energy we would like to as our land is not 
big enough to have the necessary plants installed. So we 
need to be realistic. A one size fits all policy in this 
sector is not ideal’ [20]. 
Malta had also unsuccessfully asked for an annual 
allocation of greenhouse gas emissions which exceeded that 
eventually demanded by the European Commission [22], 
[81]. On the other hand, the Government of Malta [22] 
welcomed this proposal to have national targets vary within a 
European framework, as will be discussed below. 
When the EU adopted its climate change deal, Business 
Europe pronounced its discourse for flexibility, by stating 
that  
‘the deal would still impose higher costs on companies, 
particularly SMEs, in the form of higher energy and 
CO2 prices and a greater administrative burden’ [82]. 
 Ecological Modernization: Need for Weaker Obligatory 
Targets across the EU 
The fourth discourse was the most influential discourse at 
EU level. There was agreement with the claims made by 
ENGOs for binding targets, yet they were weaker, and 
national variations were put in place, depending on the 
country in question.  
A relatively early important pointer in this regard was put 
forward by the European Commission [10] in 2006, when it 
highlighted its plans to address global warming by boosting 
clean energy and having a common external voice. 
The European Commission’s proposal [16] included the 
need to cut greenhouse gas emissions by at least 20 per cent 
by 2020 compared to 1990 levels, with a further increase to 
30 per cent should other developed nations comply through 
an international agreement. European and Maltese ENGOs 
welcomed the EC’s stance, but it was considered as not going 
far enough, and in the Maltese case, ENGOs ([14], [15]) 
expressed concern with the need for increased investment 
and drive from the Government. Indeed, according to the 
European Environmental Agency [34], unlike other 
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Mediterranean countries which have ‘quite extensive climate 
change assessments’, Malta had to date not yet prepared a 
plan on how to adapt to climate change. 
Late in 2008, negotiators from the European Parliament, 
the European Commission and the member states agreed on a 
compromise which would establish mandatory targets for 
member states in order that the EU may achieve the 20 per 
cent renewable energy target by 2020. Through the deal, the 
EU member states would be able to plan joint projects and to 
transfer renewable energy produced ‘statistically’ between 
themselves. Greenpeace hailed the agreement as a 
‘ray of light… [a] sunny spell before heavy showers, as 
European leaders create loophole after loophole in other 
parts of the EU’s package of laws to tackle climate 
change’ [36]. 
When the EU finalized its climate deal in December 2008, 
in advance of the Copenhagen summit, the agreement on a 20 
per cent reduction of CO2 emissions and 20 per cent 
production of renewable energy was adopted. Various 
compromises were made, resulting in criticism from ENGOs 
and Greens especially due to the high levels of carbon offsets. 
As a result of these compromises member states were being 
allowed to pay for emissions cuts in developing countries 
rather than in their own respective countries (Harrison and 
Jones [39]). For example, Greenpeace stated that the deal did 
not guarantee an EU emissions reduction of 20 per cent, let 
alone the required 30 per cent which was really needed as a 
bare minimum against global warming.  
The European Peoples’ Party and the European Liberals 
welcomed the deal. The European Photovoltaic Industry 
Association [82] was positive too, though critical on certain 
exemptions and Business Europe [83] lamented on higher 
costs and administrative burdens, especially on Small and 
Medium Enterprises. Yet the latter would probably have 
been even more critical if stronger targets were adopted by 
the EU. 
At a global level, and in comparison to what was proposed 
at the eventual global summit on climate change in 
Copenhagen, the EU’s position was tougher than that of 
other blocs around the world. At the same time, however, the 
EU adopted a weak position in the summit, Commenting on 
this, Nature Trust said that 
‘it is ironic that while civil society and environmental 
NGOs seem to be greatly concerned on our future, some 
world leaders are simply coming up with excuses’ [40]. 
In such a context, the EU position characterized by 
binding targets was a significant step forward on a global 
level. Notwithstanding the Copenhagen flop, there was a 
substantive impact on Malta’s policies regarding climate 
change. The Government of Malta had to comply with the 
EU target through which Malta would be required produce 
10 per cent of its energy from clean renewable sources by 
2020. Malta was also obliged to limit CO2 emissions increase 
by 5 per cent by 2020 [43]. Malta’s clean energy targets were 
the lowest in the EU, even though this presented a significant 
increase from the then current 0.36 per cent [84]. 
 Discursive Exterior: No Need for Change 
The fifth discourse was used by the environmental 
movement as a discursive exterior Mouffe [4] so as to help 
ensure that the EU does not renege on its commitment to 
reduce dependency on fossil fuels. 
Here ENGOs appealed for the phasing of subsidies to 
fossil fuels and opposed nuclear energy on environmental 
and economic grounds. ENGOs also complained that the 
European Emissions Trading Scheme was too generous, as it 
rewarded the worst polluters in the EU. According to WWF, 
the EU was handing ‘free pollution permits... [which].. is like 
handing them a cash bonus’ ([14], [85]). 
6. Discussion and Conclusions 
The results of this study show that EU provided political 
opportunities for ENGOs in relation to the construction of 
climate change policy within a framework of multi-level 
governance. 
Indeed, ‘climate change has become an important driver of 
European integration in general, as it increases the EU’s 
domestic legitimacy’ [29]. 
In the process, ecological modernization was the dominant 
discourse in terms of policy. It emphasized the reaching of 
targets technology, policy reform and complementation of 
economic and environmental factors. 
The signifier which called for a reduction in greenhouse 
gas emissions formed a nodal point ([4], [47]). The chain of 
equivalence for compulsory adaptation within the EU 
prevailed, albeit through weaker targets than those demanded 
by ENGOs. 
The EU therefore adopted a deal which condensed the 
various antagonisms represented by different discourses. The 
EU-wide compromise position constructed a broad 
hegemonic formation. 
As suggested by Laclau and Mouffe [4] in their theoretical 
analysis of hegemonic formations, specific political demands, 
such as those of ENGOs partially surrendered some of their 
claims, but ultimately conceded that a common position on 
climate change within the EU was better than not having a 
deal. In this respect, adaptation to climate change became 
mainstreamed in EU policy, in spite of the resistance of 
various national governments and business interests. The EU 
was ultimately characterized by ‘conflictual consensus’ [52] 
Consequently, policy and legislative changes took place at 
EU level, resulting in binding targets for each member state 
within an EU framework. 
Malta’s climate change policy was constructed within this 
context. From a country being devoid of energy policies in 
relation to climate change, it was now bound by targets. 
Maltese ENGOs and their European allies within the broader 
environmental movements made use of European political 
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